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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
By WAYNE F. COLLIER*
I. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN RCR 13.04 AND 11.42
Within the past year, two Kentucky Rules of Criminal
Procedure have received an expansive interpretation by the
Kentucky courts. Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr)
13.04, which had formerly been read narrowly, was given an
interpretation which expanded, at least by one, the number of
Rules of Civil Procedure applicable in criminal actions. Fur-
ther, the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that counsel is now
required to assist indigents in drafting an RCr 11.42 motion.
A. RCr 13.04
RCr 13.04 determines which Rules of Civil Procedure are
available to supplement the Rules of Criminal Procedure. RCr
13.04, as amended effective July 1, 1975, states: "Rules of civil
procedure heretofore applicable to criminal procedure shall
continue to be applicable to the extent not superseded by
these Rules." A literal interpretation of this section would im-
ply that it was intended to "grandfather" in only those Rules
of Civil Procedure used prior to July 1, 1975. This reading is
in fact erroneous, in light of past legislative action and judicial
interpretations.
1. Historical Development of RCr 13.04
In 1952, the Kentucky General Assembly enacted Ken-
tucky Revised Statutes (KRS) section 447.1551 which pro-
vided that "[t]he rules of the Court of Appeals shall apply to
criminal procedure in all situations where any provision of the
Civil Code, superseded by those rules, has heretofore been
made applicable to criminal procedure either by express refer-
ence or by interpretation." The courts interpreted this provi-
* Associate in the firm of Arnold, Bulleit & Kinkead, Lexington, Kentucky. J.D.
1979, University of Kentucky
1 1952 Ky. Acts, ch. 18, § 5.
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sion literally.2 For example, in Ex parte Noel,3 the appellant
urged application of CR 52.014 to require the judge to "find
facts specifically and to state separately [his] conclusion of
law ... -" The Court held that CR 52.01 was unavailable to
the appellant since the old Civil Code had never been applied
in a habeas corpus action.6 Clearly, this interpretation limited
the use of the Rules of Civil Procedure to rules not super-
seded by the Rules of Criminal Procedure and whose applica-
tion was justified by prior decision.
Effective January 1, 1963, RCr 13.04 was adopted as part
of the new Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.8 It stated
that the "[r]ules of civil procedure heretofore applicable to
criminal procedure by virtue of KRS § 447.155 shall continue
to be applicable to the extent not superseded by these Rules."
This provision is substantially equivalent to KRS section
447.155. Moreover, subsequent cases were decided in the same
manner as were decisions under KRS section 447.155.1 Fur-
ther, the repeal of KRS section 447.155 in 1966 had no appar-
2 See Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 365 S.W.2d 853 (Ky. 1963) (Ky. R. Civ. P.
43.07) [hereinafter cited as CR]; Anderson v. Commonwealth, 353 S.W.2d 381 (Ky.),
cert. denied, 369 U.S. 829 (1962) (CR 43.09 did not prevent an attorney who was a
prosecution witness from remaining in the courtroom when other witnesses were
excluded).
3 338 S.W.2d 930 (Ky. 1960).
" See CR 52.01 (1974). CR 52.01 has been amended twice since Ex parte Noel,
once on October 19, 1962 and again by order dated October 10, 1973.
5 338 S.W.2d at 906.
6Id.
An interesting application of this interpretation is found in Owsley v. Common-
wealth, 428 S.W.2d 199 (Ky. 1968). An affidavit for a search warrant had been sworn
before a notary public. The court held that it was permissible for a notary to adminis-
ter this oath through the application of Ky. REv. STAT. § 447.155 [hereinafter cited as
KRS] and Ky. R. CRIM. P. 13.04 [hereinafter cited as RCr] by applying CR 43.13 and
CR 28.01. CR 43.13 specifies that officers who may take depositions are enumerated
in CR 28.01, which lists notary publics. 428 S.W.2d at 201.
1 The new rules are those contained in the 1962 Ky. Acts, ch. 234, § 0.
9 For example, in Shirley v. Commonwealth, 378 S.W.2d 816 (Ky. 1964), it was
permissible to impeach a witness for the prosecution because § 597 of the CWL AND
CRIMINAL CODES OF PRACTICE OF KENTUCKY, Title XIII, Evidence (6th ed., Carroll
1919) (old Civil Code) had permitted such practice. The appellant was on trial for
robbery and had attempted to impeach the witness with prior bad acts. The court,
however, sustained the Commonwealth's objection since the prior acts were not felony
convictions. Note that both KRS 447.155 and RCr 13.04 were in effect at that time.
Id. at 818.
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ent effect upon the Court's approach to the applicability of
the Rules of Civil Procedure.1 °
Nine years later, apparently as a belated housekeeping
modification, the language "by virtue of KRS § 447.155" was
deleted from RCr 13.04. The amended rule, effective July 1,
1975, reads as follows: "Rules of Civil Procedure heretofore
applicable to criminal procedure shall continue to be applica-
ble to the extent not superceded by these rules."'" This rule
was interpreted as KRS section 447.155 had been construed. 2
10 1966 Ky. Acts, ch. 255, § 283. Stone v. Commonwealth, 456 S.W.2d 43 (Ky.
1970), raised theoretical questions as to the proper application of the Rules of Civil
Procedure under RCr 13.04. The Court reversed and remanded for a new trial on an
error which was in the record but not argued by the appellant. In support of this
action, the Court relied on both RCr 9.26 and CR 61.02. RCr 9.26 states that "[a]
conviction shall be set aside on motion in the trial court, or the judgment reversed on
appeal, for any error or defect when, upon consideration of the whole case, the court
is satisfied that the substantial rights of the defendant have been prejudiced." Ky.
Crim. Code § 9.26 is a codification of prior practices and former rules, one of those
being CrC 340 whose language was similar to RCr 9.26. See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN., RCr
9.26 (Baldwin 1978) (annotations from former section). According to Rutherford v.
Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 639 (1880), the Court granted relief on an issue not pleaded
by the appellant. This interpretation is therefore valid today.
The question arises, however, why the Court found it necessary to apply CR
61.02 also, since RCr 9.26 affords an adequate remedy. The scope of CR 61.02 is quite
similar to that of RCr 9.26. CR 61.02 provides that:
A palpable error which affects the substantial rights of a party may be
considered by the court on motion for a new trial or by the Court of Ap-
peals on appeal, even though insufficiently raised or preserved for review,
and appropriate relief may be granted upon a determination that manifest
injustice has resulted from the error.
The correct interpretation, under the old pre-emption reading afforded RCr
13.04, would be to apply RCr 9.26 alone. For additional criminal cases applying the
Rules of Civil Procedure, see Hord v. Commonwealth, 450 S.W.2d 53Q (Ky. 1970) (CR
59.04; judgment to become final 10 days after being properly signed by the judge);
Brown v. Commonwealth, 440 S.W.2d 520 (Ky. 1969) (CR 43.01 (5); Commonwealth
permitted to cross-examine own witness after she became hostile); Askew v. Com-
monwealth, 437 S.W.2d 205 (Ky. 1969) (CR 43.05; leading questions by prosecutor of
own witness); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 432 S.W.2d 805 (Ky. 1968) (CR 43.07; im-
peachment use of felony convictions); Owsley v. Commonwealth, 428 S.W.2d 199 (Ky.
1968) (see note 7 supra for a discusson of this case); Cowan v.,Commonwealth, 407
S.W.2d 695 (Ky. 1966) (CR 43.07; impeaching a defendant with felony convictions).
" RCr 13.04 (amended, effective July 1, 1975).
12 See Keller v. Commonwealth, 572 S.W.2d 157 (Ky. 1978) (CR 43.07); Lewallen
v. Commonwealth, 584 S.W.2d 748 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (CR 60.02); Bartug v. Com-
monwealth, 582 S.W.2d 61 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (CR 60.02; time spent in hospital did
not count towards sentence because defendant was not in custody); Ross v. Common-
wealth, 577 S.W.2d 6 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (CR 45.05; use of depositions at trial);
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In 1978, however, the rule was modified judicially.
2. Commonwealth v. Burris
In 1978, the Kentucky Court of Appeals decided Com-
monwealth v. Burris,'3 and in so doing applied a civil rule
which had not been held "heretofore applicable," as seemingly
required by RCr 13.04. In Burris, the convicted defendant ob-
tained a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (n.o.v.) on
grounds of insufficient evidence. The Commonwealth argued
the traditional interpretation of RCr 13.04: "that since no pre-
vious decisions had ever declared a judgment non obstante
verdicto (judgment n.o.v.) was applicable to a criminal case,
[RCr 13.04] could not have intended to 'grandfather' in such a
rule."" The court reversed the judgment n.o.v. after reassess-
ing the evidence produced at Burris' trial, but rejected the
Commonwealth's argument that the civil remedy of judgment
n.o.v. is unavailable in criminal cases. " This decision was
premised on two grounds:16 (1) the holding of Burks v. United
States;117 and (2) the purpose of RCr 13.04. In 1979, the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court agreed with the determination that
judgment n.o.v. is available in criminal cases but held that the
court of appeals had no authority to reverse the judgment, be-
cause it was not appealable by the Commonwealth."8
In Burks, the United States Supreme Court held that the
double jeopardy clause prevents a second trial to afford the
prosecution an opportunity to supply such evidence as it
failed to produce in the first trial. 9 Thus, a new trial cannot
be granted on the basis of insufficient evidence.20 The Ken-
Shanks v. Commonwealth, 575 S.W.2d 163 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978); Salisbury v. Com-
monwealth, 556 S.W.2d 922 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977); Blankenship v. Commonwealth, 554
S.W.2d 898 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977) (CR 52.04; findings upon material issues of fact).
"3 No. 78-CA-212-MR, 25 Ky. L. Suhim. 5, p. 9 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 1978)
[hereinafter cited as KLS], rev'd on other grounds, 590 S.W.2d 878 (Ky. 1979).
14 Commonwealth v. Burris, No. 78-CA-212-MR, slip op. at 1, 25 KLS 15, p. 9
(Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 590 S.W.2d 878 (Ky. 1979).
11 Id., slip op. at 2.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
" Commonwealth v. Burris, 590 S.W.2d 878 (Ky. 1979).
20 437 U.S. 1 (1978). The Supreme Court went further and commented that "it
[Vol. 68
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tucky Supreme Court recognized this rule and determined
that a judgment n.o.v. was "the only effective remedy pro-
vided at the time Burris acted."21 However, prior interpreta-
tion of RCr 13.04 would not have allowed the use of judgment
n.o.v. The Supreme Court examined the policy behind the
rule and agreed with the court of appeals that "[t]he purpose
of RCr 13.04 was clearly to provide parties to criminal actions
with such remedies permitted under both the criminal and
civil rules to prevent a miscarriage of justice."22
The significance of the Commonwealth v. Burris2 deci-
sion has been diminished by the creation of RCr 10.24,24 effec-
tive July 1, 1979, which specifically provides for judgment
n.o.v. in criminal cases. When coupled with the language of
the Court that the purpose of RCr 13.04 is to "prevent a mis-
carriage of justice," it appears that the Court has attempted
to restore a conservative construction of RCr 13.04. The Court
is allowing an expansive interpretation of RCr 13.04 only
when the defendant has no other effective remedy and now
has provided such a remedy in the instant case through RCr
10.24. Therefore, it is doubtful that the Court will read RCr
13.04 expansively in the future.
B. RCr 11.42
1. Introduction
In the post-conviction area, the RCr 11.42 motion has be-
makes no difference that a defendant has sought a new trial as one of his remedies, or
even as his sole remedy. It cannot be meaningfully said that a person 'waives' his
right to a judgment of acquittal by moving for a new trial." Id. at 17.
21 590 S.W.2d 878, 879 (Ky. 1979).
22 Id.
23 Id.
21 RCr 10.24 provides that-
Not later than five (5) days after the return of a verdict finding him
guilty of one or more offenses, a defendant who has moved for a directed
verdict of acquittal at the close of all the evidence may move to have the
verdict set aside and a judgment of acquittal entered. Likewise, if he has
been found guilty under any instruction to which at the close of all the
evidence he objected upon the ground that the evidence was not sufficient
to support a verdict of guilty under that instruction, he may move that to
that extent the verdict be set aside and a judgment of acquittal entered. A
motion for a new trial may be joined with this motion.
1979-1980]
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come extremely important. Under RCr 11.42, a motion may be
made to vacate, set aside or correct a sentence. 2 This motion
must "state specifically the grounds on which the sentence is
being challenged and the facts on which the movant relies in
support of such grounds. '28 It is of utmost importance that all
grounds be included in the motion, as RCr 11.42 relief may
only be sought once.2 7 Should the court grant the movant re-
lief, it "shall vacate the judgment and discharge, resentence,
or grant him a new trial, or correct the sentence as may be
appropriate.
'2
It is important to note the differences between appeals,
RCr 11.42 motions, and habeas corpus petitions. Considered
in order of availability, an appeal is the first procedure which
the defendant/appellant may use. Each issue must be
presented to the trial court in a timely fashion to preserve any
error for review by the appellate court.29 If the error was not
preserved, the appellate court may still grant relief if "upon
consideration of the whole case, the court is satisfied that the
substantial rights of the defendant have been prejudiced."30
The defendant may avail himself of RCr 11.42 only after
unsuccessful exhaustion of an appeal. When setting forth the
2I RCr 11.42(1) provides that "(a) prisoner in custody under sentence who claims
a right to be released on the ground that the sentence is subject to collateral attack
may at any time proceed directly by motion in the court which imposed the sentence
to vacate, set aside or correct it."
2' RCr 11.42(2).
27 RCr 11.42(3) provides that "(t)he motion shall state all grounds for holding
the sentence invalid of which the movant has knowledge. Final disposition of the
motion shall conclude all issues that could reasonably have been presented in the
same proceeding."
28 RCr 11.42(6). This determination may be appealed by either the movant or
the Commonwealth under RCr 11.42(7).
298 "Allegations of error, properly preserved by objections as provided in these
rules, in respect to rulings, orders or instructions of the court need not be presented
in a motion for a new trial in order to be preserved for appellate review." RCr 10.12.
See, e.g., Hennemeyer v. Commonwealth, 580 S.W.2d 211 (Ky. 1979); Russell v. Com-
monwealth, 482 S.W.2d 584 (Ky. 1972); Merritt v. Commonwealth, 386 S.W.2d 727
(Ky. 1965). Effective January 1, 1976, Ky. CONST. § 115 (Supp. 1978), required in part
that "[a]ppeals shall be on the record and not by trial de novo." The rationale of this
provision is clear: the appellate courts are not fact finding bodies and are not
equipped with the fact finding mechanisms available to trial courts.
30 RCr 9.26. See note 10 supra for a more detailed discussion of the scope of this
rule.
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grounds for his motion, the defendant cannot seek relief on
matters that were raised or could have been raised at trial.
Accordingly, any error which was appealable cannot be the
subject of an 11.42 motion.3 1 Habeas corpus relief, on the
other hand, is available only where an 11.42 motion would be
inadequate.3 2 The petitioner has the burden of proving the in-
adequacy of 11.42 relief.ss
2. Appointment of Counsel
Assuming that an indigent has filed an 11.42 motion, the
court is required to appoint counsel to represent the movant
at a subsequent hearing "[i]f the answer [to the motion] raises
a material issue of fact that cannot be determined on the face
of the record ....- 8 In the recent case of Ivey v. Common-
wealth,35 the Kentucky Court of Appeals determined that ap-
pointment of counsel was necessary to assist the inmate in
preparing an 11.42 motion.
The movant in Ivey argued that under RCr 11.42(3), the
final disposition of an 11.42 motion is conclusory as to all is-
sues that could have been raised. Therefore, the motion prep-
aration stage is a critical one, necessitating counsel to prevent
accidental waiver of rights.36 In support of this argument, the
appellant contended that KRS section 31.110 controlled. That
statute provides for representation of indigents in appeals and
See Yates v. Commonwealth, 375 S.W.2d 271 (Ky. 1964).
32 See, e.g., Debose v. Cowan, 490 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1973); Gray v. Wingo, 423
S.W.2d 517 (Ky. 1968). See KRS §§ 419.020-.120 (1972), 419.130 (Supp. 1978)
(habeas corpus).
33 See Ayers v. Davis, 377 S.W.2d 154 (Ky. 1964); Jones v. Thomas, 377 S.W.2d
155 (Ky.'1964); Burton v. Thomas, 377 S.W.2d 155 (Ky. 1964); Pryor v. Thomas, 377
S.W.2d 156 (Ky. 1964); Brown v. Thomas, 377 S.W.2d 156 (Ky. 1964); Coles v.
Thomas, 377 S.W.2d 157 (Ky. 1964).
31 RCr 11.42 (5) states:
Affirmative allegations contained in the answer shall be treated as con-
troverted or avoided of record. If the answer raises a material issue of fact
that cannot be determined on the face of the record the court shall grant a
prompt hearing and, if the movant is without counsel of record and is
financially unable to employ counsel, shall appoint counsel to represent him
in the proceeding, including appeal.
5 Nos. 78-CA-892-MR & 78-CA-1071-MR, 26 KLS 9 (Ky. Ct. App. June 29,
1979), disc. rev. granted, 589 S.W.2d 892 (Ky. Dec. 13, 1979).
36 Id. slip op. at 5.
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"in any other post-conviction proceeding that the attorney
and the needy person considers [sic] appropriate.
'37
The conflict was this: RCr 11.42(5) requires appointment
of counsel only if the trial court believes that a material issue
of fact exists;3 8 KRS section 31.110 contemplates the assis-
tance of an attorney when drafting an 11.42 motion.30 Apply-
ing the maxim that "conflicting acts are to be considered to-
gether and harmonized,"'40 the court read RCr 11.42(5) as not
prohibiting the appointment of counsel at the preparation
37 1972 Ky. Acts, ch. 353, § 11. KRS § 31.110 (Supp. 1978) reads as follows:
(1) A needy person who is being detained by a law enforcement officer, on
suspicion of having committed, or who is under formal charge of having
committed, or is being detained under a conviction of, a serious crime, is
entitled:
(a) To be represented by an attorney to the same extent as a
person having his own counsel is so entitled; and
(b) To be provided with the necessary services and facilities of
representation including investigation and other preparation. The
courts in which the defendant is tried shall waive all costs.
(2) A needy person who is entitled to be represented by an attorney under
subsection (1) is entitled:
(a) To be counseled and defended at all stages of the matter be-
ginning with the earliest time when a person providing his own
counsel would be entitled to be represented by an attorney and
including revocation of probation or parole;
(b) To be represented in any appeal; and
(c) To be represented in any other post-conviction proceeding
that the attorney and the needy person considers appropriate.
However, if the counsel appointed in such post-conviction rem-
edy, with the court involved, determines that it is not a proceed-
ing that a reasonable person with adequate means would be will-
ing to bring at his own expense, there shall be no further right to
be represented by counsel under the provisions of this chapter.
(3) A needy person's right to a benefit under subsections (1) and (2) is not
affected by his having provided a similar benefit at his own expense, or by
his having waived it, at an earlier stage.
This section was enacted to equate the justice available to one without financial re-
sources with that available to the affluent defendant. While no mention is made of
Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963), that case specifically requires that the criminal
justice system be as fair to the indigent as to the wealthy defendant. This statute
may be a legislative recognition of that constitutional standard.
11 See note 33 supra for citation of case authority.
39 A careful reading of KRS § 31.110 in conjunction with the realities of the
criminal system would logically lead one to conclude that if one could afford it, he
would have his attorney draft his 11.42 motion. No less must be granted the indigent.
40 Nos. 78-CA-892-MR & 78-CA-1071-MR, slip op. at 4.
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stage. The drafting of an 11.42 motion was deemed to be a
"critical stage" because it was clear that the appellant's sub-
stantial rights would be affected. 41 Therefore, all prisoners
must have access to counsel for drafting of an 11.42 motion.
Access to counsel in the drafting stage does not neces-
sarily mean that the attorney will comply with the prisoner's
desires. KRS section 31.110(2) provides that an indigent be
entitled to counsel in a post-conviction proceeding that is con-
sidered "appropriate" by both counsel and the indigent.2
This language is qualified in subsection (2)(c), which states:
[I]f the counsel appointed in such post-conviction remedy,
with the court involved, determines that it is not a proceed-
ing that a reasonable person with adequate means would be
willing to bring at his own expense, there shall be no further
right to be represented by counsel under the provisions of
this chapter.
43
This contemplates a determination by counsel of the merits of
the proposed motion. Should the attorney decide that the mo-
tion is without merit, he need not process it. Of course, the
indigent may still proceed pro se with the benefit of the attor-
ney's analysis of the case.
In a meritless case, does Ivey require the attorney to file
an Anders brief? In Anders v. California," appointed counsel
was permitted to withdraw from what he considered a wholly
frivolous appeal only if his request was accompanied by a
brief which anlayzed all issues that could possibly support the
appeal.' 5 The appellate court would then grant or deny the
withdrawal based upon the merit of the proposed arguments.
Kentucky has codified this procedure for appeals in KRS sec-
tion 31.115, but there is no similar provision for collateral pro-
ceedings.4 6 As noted above, KRS section 31.110(2) does not,
" Id. slip op. at 5.
42 See note 37 supra for the language of the statute.
43 KRS § 31.110(2)(c) (Supp. 1978).
44 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
45 Id.
46 KRS § 31.115 (Supp. 1978), provides:
(1) It shall be the duty of the attorney representing a client under any
public advocacy plan to perfect an appeal if his client requests an appeal.
(2) After the attorney has filed a notice of appeal as required by the Rules
1979-1980]
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on its face, require the public advocacy attorney to file an An-
ders brief.
4 7
The answer to Anders question may lie in that there is no
right to an 11.42 motion. The United States Supreme Court
has said that the sixth and fourteenth amendments require
that an indigent be afforded counsel upon any first appeal
provided by the state as of right.48 However, as to discretion-
ary appeals, the Court has rejected due process and equal pro-
tection arguments and held that counsel need not be
appointed. 9
Section 115 of the Kentucky Constitution provides for an
appeal as of right in both civil and criminal cases."" This man-
date is reflected in KRS section 31.110 and KRS section
31.115.51 However, there is no constitutional provision which
grants a defendant 11.42 relief as of right, and KRS section
of Criminal Procedure, he shall forward to the office for public advocacy a
copy of the final judgment, the notice of appeal, a statement of any errors
committed in the trial of the case which should be raised on appeal, and a
designation of that part of the record that is essential to the appeal.
(3) No attorney participating in any public advocacy plan shall be com-
pensated for his services until he has perfected an appeal for a client who
requests an appeal and has filed the information required in subsection (2)
of this section.
(4) Any public advocate attorney who is representing a client on appeal
who after a conscientious examination of said appeal believes the appeal to
be wholly frivolous after careful examinations of the record may request the
court to which the appeal has been taken for permisson to withdraw from
the case. The attorney must file with that request a brief which sets forth
any arguments which might possibly be raised on appeal. A copy of the
request for permisson to withdraw and the brief must be served upon the
client in sufficient time so that the client may raise any argument he
chooses to raise.
"' See note 37 supra for the language of the statute.
48 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
4' Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
10 Ky. CONST. § 115 (Supp. 1978), states:
In all cases, civil and criminal, there shall be allowed as a matter of
right at least one appeal to another court, except that the commonwealth
may not appeal from a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case, other than
for the purpose of securing a certificaton of law, and the general assembly
may prescribe that there shall be no appeal from that portion of a judgment
dissolving a marriage. Procedural rules shall provide for expeditious and
inexpensive appeals. Appeals shall be upon the record and not by trial de
novo.
91 See notes 37 and 46 supra for the language of the statutes.
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31.110 accordingly grants both the court and counsel the right
to review whether counsel should represent the movant. This
does not run afoul of Lane v. Brown,52 which requires only the
presence of counsel in collateral proceedings when an attorney
would have been retained under similar circumstances by one
with adequate financial means. 3 One may conclude, then,
that neither the federal or Kentucky Constitutions, nor legis-
lative or procedural enactments of the Commonwealth, re-
quire that counsel be appointed in every instance. This deter-
mination is properly left to the public advocacy attorney as
KRS section 31.110 clearly indicates. Under this analysis the
attorney is not required to file an Anders brief in a meritless
case.
3. Reinstatement of the Right to an Appeal
Confusion has arisen concerning when and where an ap-
peal may be reinstated. The following discussion will catego-
rize the issue by cases: those in which a notice of appeal was
filed, whether perfected or unperfected; those cases involving
belated appeals, and those cases in which no notice of appeal
was filed and the right to appeal was waived. The latter cate-
gory will then be subdivided according to whether or not the
right to an appeal had been knowingly and intelligently
waived.5
A 1978 decision, Cleaver v. Commonwealth,55 appears to
have answered the reinstatement question with respect to in-
dividuals who filed notice of appeal. In Cleaver, the appeal
was dismissed after several motions for extensions of time in
which to file the record and appellant's brief. Counsel for the
appellant then filed an 11.42 motion arguing his own ineffec-
tive assistance as grounds for reinstatement of the appeal.
.2 372 U.S. 477 (1963).
11 Id. at 479. There is additional support for the proposition that indigents have
more limited rights in procedures which are not accorded them as of right. See
United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317 (1976) (no federal constitutional or statu-
tory requirement that indigents be furnished with free trial transcripts for federal
collateral attack proceedings).
U For a synopsis of belated appeals procedure under the old code, see S. MILLER,
KENTUCKY APPELLATE PRACTICE AND FORMS § 84 (Baldwin 1920).
569 S.W.2d 166 (Ky. 1978).
1979-1980]
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The circuit court granted the motion and the Supreme Court
again dismissed. By way of explanation, Justice Sternberg
summarized the essential nature of the 11.42 motion as being
"a resumption or continuation of the criminal proceeding
• . .[;] it is primarily an attack on a sentence or judgment""6
and not a method of obtaining an appeal since "RCr 11.42
does not confer jurisdiction on a circuit court to reinstate a
right of appeal. '57 In a practical sense, to allow a circuit court
to reinstate a right to an appeal "would leave every order of
dismissal from [the appellate court] subject to judicial review
by the trial court.158 The Court concluded by noting that in
order to reinstate a lapsed or belated appeal, one must move
the court which would have heard the appeal originally.51
Cleaver is on solid ground in holding that a circuit court
may not reinstate an appeal, because the circuit court's power
to grant relief under RCr 11.42 is limited. If the court vacates
a sentence or judgment, it may only "discharge, resentence,
grant him a new trial, or correct the sentence as may be ap-
propriate." 60 If a new trial were to be granted and the peti-
tioner subsequently convicted, he would be entitled to another
appeal,61 but this would not constitute a reinstatement be-
cause the granting of a new trial voids all prior proceedings.
Should other relief be granted, both parties could appeal,
2
but that appeal is limited to "the final order or judgment of
the trial court in a proceeding brought under.[RCr 11.42]. '"63
Finally, when notice of appeal has been filed or the time limit
56 Id. at 169.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59Id.
1o RCr 11.42(6) provides:
At the conclusion of the hearing or hearings the court shall make find-
ings determinative of the material issues of fact and enter a final order ac-
cordingly. If it appears that the movant is entitled to relief, the court shall
vacate the judgment and discharge, resentence, or grant him a new trial, or
correct the sentence as may be appropriate.
" RCr 11.42(7) states that "[e]ither the movant or the Commonwealth may ap-
peal from the final order of judgment of the trial court in a proceeding brought under
this Rule."
62 Id.
63 Id.
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for filing notice has expired, the circuit court loses jurisdiction
of the appeal.0 4 The circuit court continues to have jurisdic-
tion over post-conviction remedies.6 8
The remedy suggested in Cleaver, however, is question-
able. Cleaver holds that the only method available to gain re-
instatement is to move the court which originally would have
heard the appeal."6 With the exception of judgments "impos-
ing a sentence of death or life imprisonment or imprisonment
for twenty years or more[,J" 6 7 the Kentucky Court of Appeals
would be the proper court. If the court of appeals were to re-
instate, it would permit the defendant to initiate procedures
for securing an appeal as if the judgment and sentencing of
the circuit court had just occurred. The first step would be to
file a notice of appeal and then perfect.6 8 But this violates
RCr 1.10,69 which explicitly provides that "[t]he time for...
taking an appeal shall not be extended." If notice of appeal
has been filed, however, the appellate court may extend the
time for certification of the record if a motion is made within
the original period allowed for certification or before the expi-
ration of any extension.7 0 Therefore, the court of appeals does
'4 See Hoy v. Newberg Homes, Inc., 325 S.W.2d 301 (Ky. 1959); Monsour v.
Humphrey, 324 S.W.2d 813 (Ky. 1959) (jurisdiction transferred to court of appeals
upon filing notice of appeal). If notice of appeal has been filed, the circuit court may
under RCr 1.10 and CR 73.08 extend the time for certificaton of the record, but this
must be done within 120 days of the first notice filed. The appellate court may grant
another extension within the 120 day period, the original period, or any prior exten-
sion. See CR 73.08. RCr 1.10 prohibits an extension of the time for taking an appeal
under RCr 12.04.
11 RCr 11.42(8) provides that "[t]he final order of the trial court on the motion
shall not be effective until expiration of time for notice of appeal under RCr 12.54
and shall remain suspended until final disposition of an appeal duly taken and
perfected."
so 569 S.W.2d at 169.
67 Ky. CONST. § 110 (Supp. 1978).
"s RCr 12.04 provides in pertinent part that "[a]n appeal is taken by filing a
notice of appeal in the trial court."
" RCr 1.10 states: "Where these Rules do not provide otherwise the Civil Rules
relating to time shall apply. The time for a motion for new trial, for a motion in
arrest of judgment, or for taking an appeal shall not be extended except as provided
in Civil Rule 73.08.
70 RCr 1.10 states that the time for certifying the record may be extended pursu-
ant to CR 73.08, which states:
The record on appeal as constituted under Rule 75 or Rule 76 shall be
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not have the power to grant a belated appeal if the motion for
an extension is not "made before the expiration of the period
as originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order.
7 1
Counsel's failure to secure an extension, or the court's failure
to grant an extension, would effectively remove the case from
the appellate court's jurisdiction. This is directly analogous to
the situation wherein no notice of appeal was filed. In that
case, the appellate court is without jurisdiction to entertain an
appeal 2 and likewise would be unable to grant a belated ap-
peal. If the court is without jurisdiction, it cannot act. The
Cleaver rule still applies, however, since granting an extension
to file is not a reinstatement for the simple reason that the
appeal has not yet lapsed. Since the Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals must comply with the rules promulgated by the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court, the court of appeals has no power to
hear belated or lapsed appeals.73
Although one may waive his constitutional rights,74 sec-
tion 115 of the Kentucky Constitution" provides one appeal
as of right. Lane v. Brown76 suggests that procedures which
prepared and certified by the clerk of the court from which the appeal is
taken within 60 days after the date of filing the notice of appeal except that
when more than one appeal is taken from the same judgment the court
from which the appeal is taken may prescribe the time for certification,
which shall not be less than 60 days after the date on which the first notice
of appeal was filed. In all cases the court from which the. appeal is taken
may in its discretion, with or without motion or notice, extend the time for
certifying the record on appeal, if its order for extension is made before the
period for certification as originally prescribed or extended by a previous
order, but shall not extend the time to a day more than 120 days after the
date on which the first notice of appeal was filed. The appellate court may
upon motion and showing of good cause extend the time for certificaton of
the record on appeal if the motion for extension is made before the expira-
tion of the period as originally prescribed or extended by a previous order.
71 Id.
72 Department of Highways v. Matney, 161 S.W.2d 617 (Ky. 1942). See also RCr
1.10 and RCr 12.04.
73 See Ky. CONST. §§ 115, 116 (Supp. 1978); KRS § 21A.050 (Supp. 1978); KRS §
22A.020 (Supp. 1978).
74 See Lomax v. Commonwealth, 581 S.W.2d 27 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979). In Lomax,
the court found that since the appellant knew of his right to an appeal and had opted
not to appeal on the advice of counsel, he had waived his right and was not entitled
to any extensions or to vacation of judgment solely on that ground.
75 See note 50 supra for the text of § 115.
76 372 U.S. 477 (1963).
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fail to accord a defendant those rights are unconstitutional.
Where an appeal has been taken and counsel fails to perfect
against the wishes of the defendant, there has been no waiver.
It follows that there must be a remedy available which would
allow such a defendant to reinstate the appeal.
The Kentucky Constitution empowers the Supreme Court
to promulgate rules concerning appellate jurisdiction and to
provide for expeditious and inexpensive appeals.77 According
to KRS section 21A.050, the Supreme Court may use the
Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure as well as any other
rules it might create to establish procedures for appellate re-
view.78 The fact that the Kentucky Court of Appeals is unable
to reinstate a lapsed or belated appeal does not necessarily
mean that Lane has been violated. The Cleaver Court was
correct in stating that by moving the proper court, an appeal
may be reinstated. In this instance, the Kentucky Supreme
Court is the only possibility. The reason that the Supreme
Court is appropriate is two fold: first, section 115 of the Ken-
tucky Constitution and Lane mandate that the appeal be
heard; second, since the Supreme Court has the power to con-
trol appellate procedure, it is the only body which may enter-
tain a motion to reinstate an appeal.79
Lest there be any doubt concerning the validity of
Cleaver, the Kentucky Supreme Court unanimously affirmed
the rationale of that decision in Gregory v. Commonwealth"
and Amburgey v. Commonwealth.8 1 The Cleaver rule is con-
trolling, and several cases from the Kentucky Court of Ap-
77 Ky. CONST. § 115 (Supp. 1978). See note 50 supra for the text of § 115.
78 KRS § 21A.050 (Supp. 1978) provides in pertinent part:
(2) The method of bringing a judgment, order or decree of a lower court to
the Supreme Court for review shall be established by Supreme Court rule.
The procedures for appellate review shall be established by the Rules of
Civil Procedure, Rules of Criminal Procedure and other rules promulgated
by the Supreme Court.
"' See Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963).
80 574 S.W.2d 308 (Ky. 1978). See also Gilbert v. Commonwealth, No. 78-SC-
190-MR, 25 KLS 12, p. 22 (Ky. Sept. 19, 1978) (mem.).
81 579 S.W.2d 376 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979). The Cleaver rule was affirmed, and the
Blankenship belated appeal case was cited but not discussed. The Amburgey court
affirmed the dismissal of appellant's reinstatement motion because only the Supreme
Court could reinstate on murder, rape and sodomy charges. Id. at 378.
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peals implicitly are overruled with respect to their pronounce-
ments on the reinstatement doctrine.2
Hammershoy v. Commonwealth 3 is one such case and
was the leading decision in the area of frustrated, lapsed and
belated appeals. In Hammershoy, the defendant wished to ap-
peal. His attorney filed .notice of appeal, and the defendant,
apparently dissatisfied with counsel, moved pro se to have
new counsel appointed to represent him. The court never
ruled on defendant's pro se motion but appointed another at-
torney to assist the defendant's present counsel in determin-
ing if the appeal had merit. The attorneys found the appeal to
be frivolous and apparently did not perfect for that reason.
Since the defendant lost his appeal, he moved the circuit
court under RCr 11.42 to vacate his sentence. The circuit
court denied the motion, and the movant appealed.
Justice Palmore's opinion granted the appellant relief and
directed the circuit court to vacate the conviction or grant the
defendant an appeal.84 The court relied on Lane v. Brown""
which held a procedure unconstitutional which subjected a
defendant's right of appeal to a determination of meritorious-
ness or feasibility. 8 The relief given by the Court was identi-
cal to that rendered in Lane and was in conflict with prior
case law which held that "an attack on the trial judgment is
not the appropriate remedy for a frustrated right of appeal.
'87
82 One such case is Blankenship v. Commonwealth, 554 S.W.2d 898 (Ky. Ct. App.
1977). In Blankenship, the court reversed and remanded, granting the appellant a
belated appeal where notice of appeal had been filed, but the public defender negli-
gently failed to perfect. The issue was raised under an 11.42 motion rendering Blank-
enship identical to Cleaver. The court granted relief under Hammershoy v. Common-
wealth, 398 S.W.2d 883 (Ky. i966) (to be discussed in text accompanying note 83
infra), which is distinguishable in that no notice had been filed at all. Also, Hammer-
shoy has been implicitly overruled by Cleaver. See Fullen v. United States, 378 U.S.
139 (1964); Adams v. Commonwealth, 551 S.W.2d 249 (Ky Ct. App. 1977); Perkins v.
Commonwealth, 516 S.W.2d 873 (Ky. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 971 (1975); McIn-
tosh v. Commonwealth, 368 S.W.2d 331 (Ky. 1963). All of these decisions were cited
in Blankenship and illustrate the pre-Cleaver attitude of the Kentucky courts.
83 398 S.W.2d 883 (Ky. 1966).
84 Id. at 884.
88 372 U.S. 477 (1963).
88 Id. at 483-85.
87 398 S.W.2d at 884 (citing McIntosh v. Commonwealth, 368 S.W.2d 331, 335
(Ky. 1963)). Note that McIntosh is in agreement with Cleaver.
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In so doing, the Court failed to mention that the United
States Supreme Court directed only that the appellant be af-
forded an appeal on the merits to the Indiana Supreme
Courts' and made no mention of state procedures because
there were none available. In order to gain federal habeas
corpus relief, which was the route taken by the defendant in
Lane, he must have exhausted state remedies.8 9
Under the Cleaver rationale, an appeal cannot be rein-
stated via an 11.42 motion. However, according to the forego-
ing discussion, a reinstatement remedy was available and so
the relief given in Lane would not be applicable in a Ham-
mershoy situation simply because a state procedure existed.
The appellant in Hammershoy was before the correct court
but for the wrong reason; he should have moved the court to
reinstate his appeal. If one is unable to move the court to re-
instate an appeal, then an 11.42 motion can be utilized, but it
must be appealed to the Kentucky Supreme Court since it is
the only court with the power to reinstate the appeal.
The second reinstatement categorization concerns situa-
tions wherein no appeal has been filed and the time for filing
has expired, otherwise termed belated appeals. In these cases,
one must determine whether or not the right to an appeal has
been waived. Briefly, the applicable standard requires a know-
ing and intelligent waiver but does not require technical legal
knowledge.90 The defendant need only be aware of the relief
available to him so that he may make a reasonable choice.
In Kentucky, the court is required to "advise the defen-
dant of his right to appeal .... -" The judge generally will
instruct the defendant that he has a right to an appeal and to
counsel and inform him of the time limits involved. Counsel
may provide further information as to the pros and cons of
" Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. at 485.
'g Id. at 481-82. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (Supp. 1977); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.
443 (1953) (need only exhaust one remedy); Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944)
(cannot raise claims which may still be heard in state courts); Rachel v.
Bordenkircher, 590 F.2d 200 (6th Cir. 1978) (discussion of Wainwright v. Sykes, 433
U.S. 72 (1977); "cause" and "prejudice" standard as being narrower than the Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) "deliberate by-pass rule").
90 See, e.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
"1 RCr 11.02.
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taking an appeal.92 If court and counsel act in good faith and
fulfill their obligations, the defendant will be bound by his
elected course of action.
Given that no appeal has been filed or that time has run
and that the defendant has not waived his right to an appeal,
what is his remedy? According to Cleaver, he cannot use an
11.42 motion to reinstate his right of appeal. His remedy is to
move the proper court to allow reinstatement. Assuming
merit, the court must grant this motion if the appellant is cor-
rect or provide for an appropriate procedure if it deems the
motion procedurally improper. The result is the same. The
reason? If no procedure exists, Lane requires that the sen-
tence be vacated or the appeal be reinstated. 3 If evidence
need be taken, the case can be remanded to the circuit court
for an evidentiary hearing.
The final category concerns the situation in which no no-
tice of appeal was filed and the defendant waived his right to
an appeal.4 In that case, the defendant will not have his ap-
peal reinstated. A recent decision of the Kentucky Court of
Appeals confirms this outcome. In Jones v. Commonwealth,""
no appeal was made by the defendant from a conviction for
murder. Eighteen months later he filed an 11.42 motion seek-
ing to reinstate his right of appeal. He claimed that he had
requested his attorney to file an appeal on two occasions and
that counsel had guaranteed his release in thirteen months. At
the 11.42 hearing, the court heard testimony and held that the
movant had waived his appeal.
The defendant appealed.96 The Commonwealth argued
that the court of appeals had no jurisdiction to hear the ap-
peal of the 11.42 motion. It cited Cleaver for the proposition
that to obtain a belated appeal, one must move the court
which is to entertain itY7 In Jones, the defendant had been
92 See Adams v. Commonwealth, 551 S.W.2nd 249 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
93 372 U.S. 477 (1963).
I See note 74 supra for discussion of such a case.
95 No. 78-CA-1267-MR, 26 KLS 7, p. 1 (Ky. Ct. App. May 4, 1979), petition for
reh. denied, 26 KLS 13, p. 10 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 1979).
96 Id.
97 No. 78-CA-1267-MR, slip op. at 3, 26 KLS 7, p. 1 (Ky. Ct. App. May 4, 1979),
petition for reh. denied, 26 KLS 13, p. 10 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 21 1979).
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convicted of murder. Under section 110 of the Kentucky Con-
stitution, only the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to hear the
appeal 8 and, according to Cleaver, the right to reinstate it."
As the foregoing analysis indicates, Cleaver implicitly had
overruled earlier cases which conflicted with its formulation of
the reinstatement doctrine. Nevertheless, the Jones court de-
cided that Williams v. Venters °00 was controlling. Williams
held that even where an appeal could be heard only by the
Kentucky Supreme Court under section 110, "[a] judgment or
order denying a postconviction motion. . . is not a judgment
'imposing sentence.' Hence an appeal from it is addressable to
the Court of Appeals." 10 1 Considering Cleaver, this analysis is
no longer sound.10 2 The purpose of the 11.42 motion in this
instance is to reinstate an appeal. The court of appeals does
not have jurisdiction to hear it and cannot obtain jurisdiction
by semantic artifice.
Jones v. Commonwealth exposes the practical difficulties
inherent in current reinstatement practice. All motions for re-
98 Ky. CONST. § 110 (Supp. 1978) provides:
(1) The Supreme Court shall consist of the chief justice of the common-
wealth and six associate justices.
(2) (a) The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction only, except it
shall have the power to issue all writs necessary in aid of its appellate juris-
diction, or the complete determination of any cause, or as may be required
to exercise control of the Court of Justice.
(b) Appeals from a judgment of the Circuit Court imposing a sentence of
death or life imprisonment or imprisonment for twenty years or more shall
be taken directly to the Supreme Court. In all other cases, criminal and
civil, the Supreme Court shall exercise appellate jurisdiction as provided by
its rules.
"9 Cleaver v. Commonwealth, 569 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Ky. 1978). This point has
been thoroughly discussed in text accompanying notes 55-73 supra.
100 550 S.W.2d 547 (Ky. 1977), cited in Jones v. Commonwealth, No. 78-CA-
1267-MR, slip op. at 4, 26 KLS 7, p. 1 (Ky. Ct. App. May 4, 1979), petition for reh.
denied, 26 KLS 13, p. 10 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 1979).
101 550 S.W.2d at 548.
102 Jones v. Commonwealth, No. 78-CA-1267-MR, slip op. at 8, 26 KLS 7, p. 1
(Ky. Ct. App. May 4, 1979), petition for reh. denied, 26 KLS 13, p. 10 (Ky. Ct. App.
Aug. 21, 1979). The Jones court cited Hammershoy with approval. The court rea-
soned that since Cleaver had not specifically overruled Hammershoy, it was still via-
ble. Jones v. Commonwealth, No. 78-CA-1267-MR, slip op. at 7, 26 KLS 7, p.1 (Ky.
Ct. App. May 4, 1979), petition for reh. denied, 26 KLS 13, p. 10 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug.
21, 1979). This conclusion is not warranted by a close reading of Cleaver as this arti-
cle has argued. A case need not be specifically mentioned to be overruled.
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instatement must be made to the Kentucky Supreme Court.103
Even where waiver occurs and no notice of appeal is filed, the
defendant may move the Supreme Court to reinstate the ap-
peal. The Court should promulgate a rule providing for all
motions to reinstate an appeal or file a belated appeal, to be
made in the court which would hear the appeal. Alternatively,
the Court should amend RCr 12.04 to allow the taking of an
appeal within thirty days after the date of entry of the judg-
ment or order from which it was taken, as in civil cases under
CR 73.02. However, the best solution is found in section
2953.05 of the Ohio Revised Code which provides that an ap-
peal may be taken by leave of the court to which the appeal is
taken following the expiration of normal filing deadlines. 1°4
II. PLEADING INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE ON APPEAL
Recently, the Kentucky courts have encountered a novel
argument: counsel pleads his own ineffective assistance as a
means of obtaining a new trial for his client. The issue has yet
to be addressed squarely. It presents both substantive and
procedural problems. This section will explore the appropri-
ateness of the plea as well as the difficulty in preserving the
question for appellate review.
A. Pleading One's Own Ineffective Assistance
In Cleaver v. Commonwealth,'°5 counsel pleaded his own
ineffective assistance as one of the grounds for a motion to
103 See text at notes 66-79 for analysis of this point.
104 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2953.05 (Page 1975) in its entirety reads as follows:
Appeal under section 2953.04 of the Revised Code, may be filed as a
matter of right within thirty days after judgment and sentence or from an
order overruling a motion for a new trial or an order placing the defendant
on probation and suspending the imposition of sentence in felony cases,
whichever is the latter. Appeals from judgments or final orders as above
defined in magistrate courts shall be taken within ten days of such judg-
ment or final order. After the expiration of the thirty day period or ten day
period as above provided, such appeal may be taken only by leave of the
court to which the appeal is taken. An appeal may be taken to the supreme
court by giving notice as provided by law and rule of such court within
thirty days from the journalization of judgment or final order of the court
of appeals in all cases as pro ided by law.
10" 569 S.W.2d 166 (Ky. 1978).
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reconsider a dismissal of defendant's appeal. The Supreme
Court dismissed the motion without comment. Soon after
Cleaver, the Supreme Court was faced with an identical fact
pattern in Gilbert v. Commonwealth.10 6 The ineffective assist-
ance issue was again dismissed without comment. To date, no
attorney has pleaded his ineffective assistance at trial on di-
rect appeal in the Kentucky courts.107 It should be helpful,
then, to examine the approach of other courts.
In the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, evidentiary weight
has been given to an affidavit filed by trial counsel admitting
inexperience and faulty trial conduct for the purpose of satis-
fying "cause and prejudice" requirements for federal habeas
corpus relief.108 Perhaps in later cases, the filing of this affida-
vit may trigger a presumption in favor of a sixth amendment
violation.
The leading case involving counsel's pleading his own in-
effective assistance is Shelton v. United States.10 1 The Dis-
100 No. 78-SC-190-MR, slip op. at 1, 25 KLS 12, p.22 (Ky. Sept. 19, 1978).
107 See also Wedding v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.2d 105 (Ky. 1965). In Wedding,
the entire Harrison County Bar was appointed to represent the defendant. No one
assisted him until trial and following his conviction the defendant filed an RCr 11.42
motion. He alleged ineffective assistance at trial. When questioned, the attorneys ad-
mitted that they had made no reasonable preparation for trial. Since the court found
that the trial had not constituted a farce and a mockery, they apparently relied heav-
ily on this testimony. Id. at 105-06. The dissent pointed out that unless the trial
could be found a "farce and a mockery," no relief could be granted. Id. at 106-09. For
greater insight into the application of Kentucky's farce and mockery standard, See,
e.g., Nickell v. Commonwealth, 565 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1978); Vaughan v. Common-
wealth, 505 S.W.2d 768 (Ky. 1974); Rice v. Davis, 366 S.W.2d 153 (Ky. 1963); Blank-
enship v. Commonwealth, 554 S.W.2d 898 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977). But see Beasley v.
United States, 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974) (standard for ineffective assistance in the
Sixth Circuit). For a critique on these two theories, see Campbell, Kentucky Law
Survey-Criminal Procedure, 63 Ky. L.J. 701 (1975); Comment, Kentucky's Stan-
dard for Ineffective Counsel: A Farce and a Mockery?, 63 Ky. L.J. 803 (1975).
In Kentucky, it also is difficult to obtain the dismissal of an appointed attorney.
"Adequate and sufficient cause for removal of counsel . . . includes (1) complete
breakdown of communications between counsel and defendant, (2) conflict of inter-
est, and (3) legitimate interests of the defendant are being prejudiced." Baker v.
Commonwealth, 574 S.W.2d 325, 327 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
"' See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); Rachel v. Bordenkircher, 590
F.2d 200 (6th Cir. 1978); Canary v. Bland, 583 F.2d 887 (6th Cir. 1978). For an expla-
nation of federal habeas corpus relief, see Quick, Kentucky Law Survey-Criminal
Procedure, 66 Ky. L.J. 605, 620-24 (1978).
100 323 A.2d 717 (D.C. 1974). See also Reavis v. United States, 395 A.2d 75, 79 n.
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trict of Columbia Court of Appeals commented:
It is apparent to us that an attorney has an inherent
conflict of interest in such a situation. On the one hand, it is
his duty as a member of the bar to argue in behalf of the
defendant as vigorously as possible. On the other hand, he
has his own self-interest to consider; that is, his reputation
as an attorney.110
The court also delineated the standard to which counsel must
adhere in pleading his case:
[W]here an attorney has represented a convicted defen-
dant at trial and, as the defendant's attorney on appeal, con-
cludes in good faith that a legitimate issue exists as to the
constitutional adequacy of his representation of the defen-
dant at trial, it is the duty of the attorney to move to with-
draw as counsel on appeal."'
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility obli-
gates a lawyer to represent his client "zealously within the
bounds of the law. ' 112 In the present context, an attorney
must put aside his feelings of embarrassment and plead his
ineffective assistance or inform present counsel of his beliefs
to preserve the defendant's rights on appeal. However, one
should do this only if there exists "a legitimate issue... as to
the constitutional adequacy of his representation .... M13
Such a rule is not without its ethical problems and poten-
tial for abuse. In some respects, an attorney arguing his own
ineffective assistance analogizes to the situation of the attor-
ney acting as a witness. Disciplinary Rule 5-102(A) obligates
counsel to withdraw his representation if he must serve as a
witness. 114 This dilemma can be solved by strictly enforcing
3 (D.C. 1978); Harling v. United States, 372 A.2d 1011, 1013 (D.C. 1977).
110 323 A.2d at 718.
Id.
12 Canon 7, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (ABA) CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY.
"s 323 A.2d at 718.
14 "If, after undertaking employment in contemplated or pending litigation, a
lawyer learns or it is obvious that he .... ought to be called as a witness on behalf of
his client, he shall withdraw from the conduct of the trial ...... Disciplinary Rule 5-
102(A), ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY [hereinafter cited as DR].
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the good faith requirement of Shelton. Perhaps the more diffi-
cult problem is the creation of a conflict of interest. If the at-
torney continues his representation of the defendant, will he
be honest even to the detriment of his professional reputa-
tion? Disciplinary Rule 5-101(A) indicates that an attorney
"shall not accept employment if the exercise of his profes-
sional judgment on behalf of his client will be or reasonably
may be affected by his own financial, business, property or
personal interests." Reading Disciplinary Rules 5-102(A) n1 5
and 5-105(A) 116 together, the spirit of the provisions requires
an attorney to withdraw if substantial rights of his client may
be affected or prejudiced.
In light of the above analysis, the Shelton approach is the
soundest resolution. First, the attorney must in good faith be-
lieve his effectiveness at trial may be legitimately questioned.
If he so concludes, then he must move to withdraw to avoid a
Canon 5 conflict of interest.
B. Ineffective Assistance and the Right of Appeal
According to the weight of precedent in Kentucky, an ap-
pellate court will not review the issue of ineffective assistance
of counsel unless it has been presented to the trial court for'
consideration,11 7 or where no transcript has been prepared.11 8
In most circumstances, the defendant will be unable to pre-
sent the issue before the appellate court on direct appeal and
must rely on a post-conviction motion. This occurs because
(1) the average criminal defendant is unable to evaluate the
performance of counsel, (2) the trial attorney rarely pleads his
own ineffective assistance, and (3) if new counsel is appointed
15 See note 114 supra for text of DR 5-102(A).
116 "A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of his independ-
ent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely
affected by the acceptance of the proffered employment. .. ."
11 Hennemeyer v. Commonwealth, 580 S.W.2d 211, 216 (Ky. 1979); Hamilton v.
Commonwealth, 580 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Ky. 1979).
"' McIntosh v. Commonwealth, 582 S.W.2d 54, 61 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979). See also
Bendingfield v. Commonwealth, 78-SC-427-MR, 26 KLS 8, p. 10 (Ky. June 12, 1979)
(mem. per curiam) in which the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed and remanded
the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel to the trial court to hold an evidentiary
hearing allowing the trial attorney to explain his conduct.
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for appeal, it is usually after time has expired for making a
motion for a new trial.1 9 Ultimately, this results in a bifur-
cated process for the consideration of error. The concern is
that if error should be considered partially on appeal and the
remainder under an 11.42 motion, then the appellant may be
denied relief even though the error, if considered as a whole,
may constitute an adequate basis for granting relief.
In Kentucky, there is one appeal as of right. Section 115
of the Kentucky Constitution, which became effective January
1, 1976, provides that "[i]n all cases, civil and criminal, there
shall be allowed as of right at least one appeal to another
court. . . [and that such] [a]ppeals shall be upon the record
and not by trial de novo." The case law is consistent in requir-
ing that the claim or error be preserved for review,120 but
overlooks the fact that as a practical matter, ineffective assist-
ance is rarely so preserved.
Ivey v. Commonwealth'21 offers insight into a possible
19 RCr 10.06 provides:
The motion for a new trial shall be served not later than five (5) days
after return of the verdict. A motion for a new trial based upon the ground
of newly discovered evidence shall be made within one (1) year after the
entry of the judgment or at a later time if the court for good cause so
permits.
120 Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 580 S.W.2d 208, 210-11 (Ky. 1979). In Hamilton,
the Court noted that the United States Supreme Court in Pottg v. Kentucky, 435
U.S. 919 (1978) had "dismissed for want of a substantial federal question" an appeal
from the Kentucky Court of Appeals, which had upheld a determination "that the
issue of ineffectiveness of counsel could not be raised on appeal when it has never
been presented to the trial court." Id. at 211. The Kentucky Supreme Court con-
cluded that dismissal for "want of a substantial federal question" constituted a deci-
sion on the merits. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975). Normally, this is a
sound conclusion. Here, however, the opinion below was merely a one-line affimance.
See Potts v. Commonwealth, 561 S.W.2d 682 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977). The decision af-
firmed was an unpublished opinion of the Greenup Circuit Court. The findings of
fact, conclusions of law, and opinion of the circuit court are unavailable. An unpub-
lished opinion may not be cited in any case in Kentucky. See CR 76.28(4)(c) which
provides that "[o]pinions that are not to be published shall not be cited or used as
authority in any other case in any court of this state." See also Jones v. Common-
wealth, No. 78-CA-1267-MR, 26 KLS 7, p. 1 (Ky. Ct. App. May 4, 1979), petition for
reh. denied, 26 KLS 13, p. 10 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 1979); Yocum v. Justice, 569
S.W.2d 678 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977). In light of the foregoing, Potts is no precedent at all.
Additionally, it is unclear if the potential conflict with section 115 of the Kentucky
Constitution which allows one appeal as of right was addressed.
121 Nos. 78-CA-892-MR & 78-CA-1071-MR, 26 KLS 9, p. 8 (Ky. Ct. App. June
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means of assuring protection of a defendant's rights in this
context. In Ivey, the court of appeals determined that the
preparation of an 11.42 motion was a critical stage requiring
the assistance of counsel because an appellant, unskilled in
the practice of law, might unknowingly fail to include all
proper grounds for his motion, thus precluding consideration
by the court except by way of extraordinary relief.12 2 The
court relied upon KRS section 31.110, which provides for as-
sistance of counsel in post-conviction proceedings. 123 KRS sec-
tion 31.110 is stringent with respect to the appointment of
counsel on appeal providing that an indigent has the right
"[t]o be represented in any appeal .. ,.". If Ivey means
that legal assistance for the drafting of 11.42 motions is a crit-
ical stage, then it follows that the review of an attorney's per-
formance after conviction and prior to appeal is also a critical
stage. The rules provide only five days for a motion for new
trial. If the attorney, the court, or the prosecution believes
there is a question of adequacy of representation and has sub-
stantial proof on the matter, then independent counsel should
be appointed immediately. An automatic extension of the
time for filing the new trial motion should be granted to allow
the new counsel to review the matter.
29, 1979), disc. rev. granted, 589 S.W.2d 892 (Ky. Dec. 13, 1979).
22 Id. slip op. at 5.
123 Id. at 4-5.
124 KRS § 31.110(2)(b). Naturally, counsel is only available to an indigent to the
same extent as a person having his own counsel, KRS § 31.110 (Supp. 1978), but the
right to an appeal is automatic, Ky. CONST. § 115 (Supp. 1978), and therefore counsel
should be provided to implement the appeal.
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